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I. Introduction 
Facebook, Inc. (Facebook) “went public” on NASDAQ on May 
18, 2012, raising $16 billion—the third-largest initial public 
offering (IPO) in the history of the United States.1 In the first 30 
seconds of trading, 80 million shares changed hands.2 By the end 
of the first day, 567 million shares had been traded.3 This was the 
highest volume of shares traded in an IPO, “smashing” General 
Motors Co.’s previous record of 450 million shares.4 The records 
do not stop there, however. 
                                                                                                     
 1. April Dembosky & Telis Demos, Faltering Start for the New Facebook, 
FT.COM (May 18, 2012, 11:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7bfd916-a113-
11e1-9fbd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Jqp27Nkz (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (noting 
that the Facebook IPO trailed VISA’s IPO in 2009 and General Motors’s IPO in 
2010 in terms of funds raised) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 2. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Trading Sets Record IPO Volume, CNN 
MONEY (May 18, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/18/technology/ 
facebook-ipo-trading/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3 Id. 
 4. Id. 
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The Facebook IPO also resulted in the largest number of 
lawsuits ever filed due to an IPO.5 As of September 2012, only 
four months after the IPO, twenty-nine securities class action 
lawsuits had been filed.6 By December 2012, seven months after 
the IPO, forty-one actions, and counting, were filed.7 As a result 
of “system difficulties” experienced by NASDAQ, major market 
makers and broker dealers lost approximately $500 million in the 
IPO.8 Losses of this scale, and in this context, prompt a difficult 
question: What is the extent of NASDAQ’s liability for its system 
difficulties?9 The extent of NASDAQ’s liability is complicated. 
Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act),10 Congress established a regulatory system that relies upon 
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to regulate and administer 
the day-to-day conduct of the national securities exchanges under 
the supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).11 Since that time, many of the SROs have become private, 
                                                                                                     
 5. See David Benoit, Another Facebook IPO Superlative: Most 2012 
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://blogs. 
wsj.com/deals/2012/09/26/another-facebook-ipo-superlative-most-2012-lawsuits/ 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2013) (“Facebook is getting sued. A lot.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. Id. (“In 2001, when the tech bubble was soaring and plenty of IPOs 
went sour, no IPO faced more than four separate lawsuits [according to Stanford 
University’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse] . . . .”). 
 7. In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Deriv. Litig., 288 F.R.D. 26, 31 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (MDL No. 12-2389) [hereinafter SDNY Consolidation Order]. 
This is according to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York (SDNY), which, per the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, was 
assigned the actions stemming from the Facebook IPO. Id. at 29. 
 8. John McCrank, UBS Says Nasdaq’s Facebook Compensation Plan 
Inadequate, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/08/23/us-nasdaq-facebook-compensation-idUSBRE87L0W620120823 (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. Legal actions for securities regulation violations have been filed against 
Facebook, Facebook’s officers, and the underwriters who participated in the 
IPO. These actions are outside the scope of this Note. For a broad overview of 
those actions, see SDNY Consolidation Order, supra note 7, at 31–34; Julianne 
Pepitone, Facebook IPO: What the %$#! Happened?, CNN MONEY (May 23, 2012, 
6:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/23/technology/facebook-ipo-what-went-
wrong/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing a general overview of the 
claims sparked by the Facebook IPO) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 11. See Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th 
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for-profit corporations.12 NASDAQ is an SRO, a national 
securities exchange, and a “quasi-private” regulatory entity that 
“operate[s] as an additional layer of investor protection” in the 
regulatory system.13 NASDAQ is also a private company with 
$3.4 billion in gross revenues, net income of $383 million, and 
over 173 million shares of common stock.14  
In light of the governmental functions it provides, NASDAQ 
is protected by absolute immunity when it performs its quasi-
governmental, “statutorily delegated adjudicatory, regulatory, 
and prosecutorial functions.”15 But NASDAQ is not entitled to 
absolute immunity when it acts pursuant to its “non-
governmental” and “private business interests.”16 The question 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that SROs “conduct the day-to-day regulation and 
administration of the United States stock markets, under the close supervision 
of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission”). 
 12. Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
151, 159–70 (2008) (describing the history of NASDAQ and the NYSE and 
noting their present status as “public companies”). 
 13. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 16, 45 (3d ed. 2012). 
 14. The NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc., Annual Report, 1, F-4 (Form 10-K) 
(2011) [hereinafter NASDAQ Annual Report]. 
 15. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 (citing Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 
F.3d 49, 58, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts have not hesitated to extend the 
doctrine of absolute immunity to private entities engaged in quasi-public 
adjudicatory and prosecutorial duties.”); see also D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 
Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Barbara stood for the broader proposition 
that a[n] SRO, such as [NASDAQ], may be entitled to immunity from suit for 
conduct falling within the scope of the SRO’s regulatory and general oversight 
functions.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that when 
NASD “acts in [its] capacity to suspend trading, NASD is performing a 
regulatory function cloaked in immunity”); Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
Dealers, No. 94-7058, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 41840, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 
1996) (per curiam) (noting that while SROs “are entitled to absolute immunity 
for actions that are prosecutorial or adjudicative in nature . . . absolute 
immunity does not extend to acts that are purely investigatory or 
administrative” (citations omitted)); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that an SRO “is entitled 
to absolute immunity for its role in disciplining its members and associates”). 
 16. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 (noting that “efforts to increase trading 
volume and company profit, as well as the daily administration and 
management of other business affairs” are considered serving “private business 
interests” and are thus a “non-governmental function” not entitled to absolute 
immunity). 
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raised by the Facebook IPO is whether the $500 million loss was 
a result of NASDAQ’s “statutorily delegated adjudicatory, 
regulatory, and prosecutorial functions.” NASDAQ unequivocally 
asserts that the actions it took during the IPO were undertaken 
pursuant to its regulatory function and are thus covered by 
absolute immunity.17 Additionally, NASDAQ has agreed to “pay 
[the SEC] $10 million, the largest fine ever levied against an 
exchange, to settle accusations that it had violated numerous 
rules before and after the IPO” with its “poor systems and 
decision making.”18  
The problem with the Facebook IPO is that the law is 
ambiguous about drawing the line between actions taken 
pursuant to an SRO’s regulatory function and its “non-
governmental” and “private business interest[].”19 In the case of a 
quasi-private SRO, such as NASDAQ, the law is unclear about 
whether the SRO’s actions are protected by absolute immunity. 
The two functions may even coincide in the same conduct, as they 
appear to here.  
The ambiguity that underlies NASDAQ’s liability is 
important and problematic. The capital markets and SROs such 
as NASDAQ are too important to the economic stability of the 
United States and the world for there to be such confusion over 
the extent of their liability.20 NASDAQ OMX Group, the company 
                                                                                                     
 17. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend Rule 4626–
Limitation of Liability, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67507, 77 Fed. Reg. 
45,706, 45,714 (July 26, 2012) (SR-NASDAQ-2012-090) [hereinafter NASDAQ 
Proposal], http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2012/34-67507.pdf (noting that 
“exchanges are . . . immune from civil liability for claims for damages caused by 
actions taken in connection with the discharge of their regulatory duties). 
NASDAQ explicitly states that “[i]n an exercise of its regulatory authority, 
Nasdaq determined to proceed with the IPO . . . rather than postpone it.” Id. at 
45,707 (emphasis added). 
 18. Nathaniel Popper, Nasdaq Is Fined $10 Million over Mishandled 
Facebook Public Offering, DEALBOOK (May 29, 2013, 2:09 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/nasdaq-to-pay-10-million-fine-over-
facebook-i-p-o/?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 19. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
 20. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that NASDAQ has, on 
average, $55.5 billion worth of shares trading daily on its exchange). 
Furthermore, the total market valuation of the companies listed on NASDAQ is 
$3.9 trillion. Id.  
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behind the NASDAQ stock market, “owns and operates 24 
markets, 3 clearing houses, and 5 central securities depositories, 
spanning six continents—making [it] the world’s largest 
exchange company.”21 It is “the largest single liquidity pool for US 
equities,” and it is “the power behind 1 in 10 of the world’s 
securities transactions.”22 Should an event suddenly impose 
massive liability upon NASDAQ, even without bankrupting the 
company completely, the knock-on effects would be felt 
worldwide.23  
The SEC is failing to “play[] an active role in overseeing . . . 
Nasdaq . . . to ensure that [it is] protecting investors.”24 SEC 
Chairman Mary Jo White agrees, stating that “the current nature 
of exchange competition and the self-regulatory model should be 
fully evaluated in light of the evolving market structure and 
trading practices.”25 SEC Chairman White goes on to say that 
“[t]he SEC should review whether the oversight of exchanges 
‘continues to meet the needs of investors and public companies.’”26 
This Note calls for the SEC to address the ambiguity in the law 
with respect to whether SROs, such as NASDAQ, are acting 
pursuant to their regulatory function.27 
The Note is divided into three substantive Parts. Part II 
provides an analysis of the present state of the law regarding 
                                                                                                     
 21. What is NASDAQ?, NASDAQ OMX, (2014) http://www.nasdaq 
omx.com/aboutus/whatisnasdaq/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,714 (“If exchanges could be 
called upon to bear all costs associated with system malfunctions and the 
varying reactions of market participants taken in their wake, the potential 
would exist for a single catastrophic event to bankrupt one or multiple 
exchanges, with attendant consequences for investor confidence and 
macroeconomic stability.”). 
 24. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 16. 
 25. Andrew Ackerman, Scott Patterson & Jacob Bunge, Policing of 
Exchanges Questioned, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2013, 8:04 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304906704579111483532305624
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 26. Id. (quoting SEC Chairman White). 
 27. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 46 (noting that the SEC is 
empowered to “approve, disapprove[,] or modify SRO rules as it ‘deems 
necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory 
organization’ under § 19 of the Exchange Act”). 
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SRO absolute immunity. Part III describes the events of the 
Facebook IPO and illustrates how the law, as it stands, is 
inadequate to determine with any certainty whether NASDAQ’s 
actions during the Facebook IPO were pursuant to its regulatory 
function and warranted absolute immunity, or whether its 
actions were pursuant to its nongovernmental private business 
interests and did not warrant absolute immunity. Part IV 
presents a new approach—first, NASDAQ, and other similarly 
situated SROs such as the NYSE, should adopt living wills 
specifying the national securities exchange’s operating costs for a 
full year; second, those costs should be unconditionally protected 
by absolute immunity; and finally, only those actions of SROs 
undertaken pursuant to their prosecutorial and adjudicatory 
functions warrant absolute immunity. 
II. SRO Liability Today 
NASDAQ’s potential liability for the Facebook IPO is far 
from settled. The extent, or very existence, of liability hinges 
upon the crucial determination of whether the actions taken by 
NASDAQ on May 18, 2012, were pursuant to NASDAQ’s 
regulatory function or its nongovernmental private business 
interests. Essentially, the question is whether NASDAQ was 
acting as an SRO or as a private, for-profit corporation. Part II 
discusses (A) the general framework of the present regulatory 
system and NASDAQ’s place within it and (B) the concept of 
absolute immunity, how it is determined, and what kinds of 
actions it protects. This Part also details instances in which 
absolute immunity has been afforded or withheld. 
A. SROs Within the Present Regulatory Scheme and NASDAQ’s 
Place Within It 
Pursuant to the Exchange Act, Congress established a 
regulatory system that relies upon SROs to “conduct the day-to-
day regulation and administration of the United States stock 
markets, under the close supervision of the United States 
1526 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1519 (2014) 
Securities and Exchange Commission.”28 The SEC, in 1997, 
authorized the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
(NASD), an SRO, to delegate its SRO functions to its subsidiary, 
NASDAQ, permitting NASDAQ to “operate and oversee” the 
NASDAQ stock market.29 The NASD “authorized Nasdaq to 
develop, operate, and maintain the Nasdaq Stock Market, to 
formulate regulatory policies and listing criteria for the Nasdaq 
Stock Market, and to enforce those policies and rules, subject to 
the approval of the NASD and ultimately the SEC.”30 
Thereafter, NASDAQ served as an SRO pursuant to the 
Exchange Act.31 In addition to operating as an SRO, NASDAQ 
has, like many other SROs, become a for-profit corporation.32 In 
2000, the NASD sold restricted shares of NASDAQ through a 
private placement offering.33 Then, in 2002, NASDAQ’s shares 
began trading on the Over the Counter (OTC) Bulletin Board, 
and in 2005, via an offering of secondary shares, NASDAQ was 
listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market.34 Now, NASDAQ is a 
private, for-profit company with $3.4 billion in gross revenues, 
net income of $383 million, and over 173 million shares of 
common stock.35 
                                                                                                     
 28. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
 29. See id. (citing Order Approving the Plan of Allocation and Delegation of 
Functions by NASD to Subsidiaries, SEC Release No. 34-39326, 62 Fed. Reg. 
62,385 (Nov. 21, 1997) (approving the delegation of powers whereby “Nasdaq 
was given sole responsibility to operate and oversee the Nasdaq market”)); DL 
Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“The NASD has delegated some of its regulatory powers and responsibilities as 
an SRO to Nasdaq.”). 
 30. DL Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 95. 
 31. See Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 (“NASDAQ serves as an SRO within 
the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act . . . which vests it with a variety of 
adjudicatory, regulatory, and prosecutorial functions, including implementing 
and effectuating compliance with securities laws; promulgating and enforcing 
rules governing the conduct of its members; and de-listing stock offerings.”). 
 32. When Did NASDAQ OMX First Go Public?, NASDAQ OMX (2013), 
http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/faq.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. NASDAQ Annual Report, supra note 14, at 1, F-4. 
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NASDAQ operates as both an SRO and a private,36 for-
profit corporation.37 As a “private corporation, NASDAQ may 
engage in a variety of non-governmental activities that serve its 
private business interests, such as its efforts to increase trading 
volume and company profit, as well as its daily administration 
and management of other business affairs.”38 As an SRO, 
NASDAQ acts as a quasi-governmental authority that effectively 
“stands in the shoes of the SEC,” performing regulatory functions 
that the SEC would otherwise perform.39 The resulting tension 
has been noticed by the SEC, which has stated that “[a]s 
competition among markets grows, the markets that SROs 
operate will continue to come under increased pressure to attract 
order flow. . . . [The resulting] business pressure can create a 
strong conflict between the SRO[’s] regulatory and market 
operations functions.”40 Crucially, it is along the distinction 
between these two functions that the question of NASDAQ’s 
liability hinges.  
NASDAQ, even though it may act for the government in its 
capacity as an SRO, is not afforded sovereign immunity like a 
governmental agency.41 Instead, SROs are provided with 
“absolute immunity when performing governmental functions” 
but “cannot claim that immunity when they perform non-
governmental functions” or act in their “own interest[s] as . . . 
private entit[ies].”42 Governmental functions include regulatory, 
                                                                                                     
 36. “Private” in this context reflects the fact that it is owned by private 
individuals and not the government. NASDAQ OMX Group is not a private 
company in the business sense given that it trades on the NASDAQ stock 
market and is therefore most appropriately considered a public company. 
 37. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text (describing the unique 
position of SROs such as NASDAQ that operate both as quasi-governmental 
SROs as well as nongovernmental private, for-profit corporations). 
 38. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
 39. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (quoting D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 
2001)). 
 40. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 n.4 (quoting Concept Release Concerning 
Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 
71,261–62 (Dec. 8, 2004)). 
 41. See id. at 1296 (noting that SROs “lack the sovereign immunity that 
governmental agencies enjoy”). 
 42. Id. at 1296–97 (“SROs are protected by absolute immunity when they 
1528 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1519 (2014) 
adjudicatory, or prosecutorial activities that might ordinarily be 
performed by a governmental agency—only in the performance of 
those or similar activities do SROs have absolute immunity.43 
Conceptually, SROs are entitled to absolute immunity when 
“acting under the aegis of the Exchange Act’s delegated 
authority.”44 It is an SRO’s “function as a quasi-governmental 
authority that entitles it to absolute immunity.”45 Because an 
SRO’s absolute immunity is conditioned on the nature of the 
function being performed, the determination of what type of 
function the SRO is performing is critical in situations where the 
SRO is exposed to potential liability, such as the Facebook IPO. 
B. Determining Absolute Immunity 
In determining whether an action by an SRO warrants 
absolute immunity, a court considers the “objective nature and 
function of the activity for which the SRO seeks to claim 
immunity.”46 The test does not hinge on an SRO’s subjective 
                                                                                                     
perform their statutorily delegated adjudicatory, regulatory, and prosecutorial 
functions. . . . [A]bsolute immunity must be coterminous with an SRO[’]s 
performance of a governmental function.” (citing Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 
99 F.3d 49, 58, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts have not hesitated to extend the 
doctrine of absolute immunity to private entities engaged in quasi-public 
adjudicatory and prosecutorial duties.”); D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 
F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001); Sparta Surgical 
Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 94-7058, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 
41840, at *1–2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 1996) (per curiam); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. 
Nat’’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1985))). 
 43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (detailing how SROs are 
entitled to absolute immunity when acting pursuant to their quasi-
governmental functions but not when acting pursuant to their private, for-profit 
interests). 
 44. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc) (quoting Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 
F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 45. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 93 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
 46. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1297; see also Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012) (describing “a functional test to determine 
whether an SRO is entitled to immunity based upon the facts . . . which requires 
[the court] to look at ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of 
the actor who performed it’” (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 
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intent or motivation.47 The propriety of actions or inactions is 
irrelevant.48 The “central question [in] SRO-immunity cases is . . . 
whether the plaintiff’s allegations concern the exercise of powers 
within the bounds of the government functions delegated to it.”49 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Weissman v. National Ass’n of Securities 
Dealers,50 rejected the proposition that an SRO is granted 
absolute immunity for “all activity that is merely ‘consistent 
with’” the SRO’s delegated powers.51 This position puts the 
Eleventh Circuit at odds with the Second Circuit, which does 
afford absolute immunity for actions that are “consistent with” an 
SRO’s delegated powers.52 The Second Circuit, in Standard 
Investment Chartered v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers,53 
stated that while “[t]here is no question that an SRO and its 
officers are entitled to absolute immunity from private damages 
suits in connection with the discharge of their regulatory 
responsibilities . . . the doctrine ‘is of a rare and exceptional 
character,’” and “courts must examine the invocation of absolute 
immunity on a case by case basis.”54 Lastly, when deciding 
whether to grant SROs like NASDAQ immunity for their actions, 
courts frequently turn to the statutorily delegated responsibilities 
                                                                                                     
(1988))). 
 47. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1297. 
 48. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 07-CV-
2014, 2010 WL 749844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (citing In re NYSE 
Specialists S.E.C. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)), aff’d per curiam, 500 
F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 49. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 50. 500 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 51. Id. at 1298. But see NYSE Specialists, 503 F.3d at 93, 99 (affording 
absolute immunity for “specific functions” that are “‘consistent with’ the exercise 
of power delegated to the SRO”); DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., 
Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2005) (affording absolute immunity for actions 
“consistent with the quasi-governmental powers delegated to it by the NASD 
pursuant to the Exchange Act”). 
 52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (detailing the Second 
Circuit’s position). 
 53. 637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 
(2012). 
 54. Id. at 115–16 (citing Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571 (2d 
Cir. 1986)). 
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of such bodies.55 The statutorily delegated responsibilities of 
NASDAQ require it 
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to 
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster 
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in 
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with 
respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to 
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free 
and open market and a national market system, and, in 
general, to protect investors and the public interest.56 
The following two sections provide examples of SROs being either 
afforded or denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and 
upon a variety of claims. 
1. Actions Afforded Absolute Immunity 
Absolute immunity is most simply determined in cases 
involving an SRO acting pursuant to its prosecutorial or 
adjudicatory function. In Austin Municipal Securities, Inc. v. 
National Ass’n of Securities Dealers,57 the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
an SRO, in that case NASD, was “entitled to absolute immunity 
for its role in disciplining its members and associates.”58 The 
Second Circuit concurred in Barbara v. New York Stock 
Exchange,59 in which the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
brought disciplinary charges against an employee of a member of 
the NYSE.60 In Barbara, the employee was permanently banned 
from the exchange, despite the fact that the charges were later 
reversed on procedural grounds.61 The Second Circuit had little 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012) to determine 
“NASDAQ’s statutorily delegated responsibility”). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012). 
 57. 757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 58. Id. at 692. 
 59. 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 60. See id. at 59 (noting that the employee “alleged abuses in the conduct of 
the Exchange’s disciplinary proceedings”). 
 61. See id. at 52 (“Barbara alleged in his complaint that agents and officers 
of the Division had wrongfully barred him from the Exchange floor, thereby 
damaging Barbara’s reputation and causing him to lose employment 
opportunities with two Exchange members, and ultimately to leave the 
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trouble determining that the NYSE was absolutely immune from 
damages arising out of the allegedly abusive performance of its 
disciplinary function.62  
Later, the Second Circuit, in D’Alessio v. New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc.,63 ruled that the NYSE was entitled to absolute 
immunity despite allegations that it had, in pursuit of its 
disciplinary function against a member’s employee, incorrectly 
interpreted and applied the securities laws as well as improperly 
preformed its interpretive, enforcement, and referral functions, 
specifically its “quasi-public adjudicatory” function.64 The United 
States Attorney’s Office and the SEC, with the assistance of the 
NYSE, suspended D’Alessio from the floor of the NYSE and 
investigated him for pursuing trading strategies that D’Alessio 
maintained were endorsed by the NYSE itself.65 The court stated 
that the “alleged misconduct falls within the scope of [the] quasi-
governmental powers delegated to the NYSE pursuant to the 
Exchange Act and, therefore, conclude[d] that absolute immunity 
precludes D’Alessio from recovering money damages in 
connection with his claims.”66 The NYSE explicitly argued that “it 
is absolutely immune from suit because the allegations in the 
complaint are predicated on the NYSE’s improper performance of 
the regulatory functions delegated by the SEC to the NYSE 
pursuant to the Exchange Act.”67 The NYSE’s argument prevailed 
at both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                     
securities industry.”). 
 62. See id. at 59 (“As a private corporation, the Exchange does not share in 
the SEC’s sovereign immunity, but its special status and connection to the SEC 
influences our decision to recognize an absolute immunity from suits for money 
damages with respect to the Exchange’s conduct of disciplinary proceedings.”).  
 63. 258 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001). 
 64. See id. at 93 (“The NYSE’s alleged improper interpretation of the type 
of conduct prohibited under [the securities laws] falls within the NYSE’s ‘quasi-
public adjudicatory’ duties.”). 
 65. Id. at 97 (“D’Alessio contends that he relied on the NYSE’s 
interpretation at the time he engaged in trading practices that were later 
determined to be illegal.”). D’Alessio further contended that “the NYSE, in an 
effort to keep its activities secret and curry favor with law enforcement 
authorities, assisted the United States Attorney’s Office and the SEC in their 
investigation and prosecution of D’Alessio by providing them with ‘false, 
misleading and inaccurate information about . . . D’Alessio.’” Id. at 97–98. 
 66. Id. at 106. 
 67. Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 
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Second Circuit.68 Therefore, the NYSE was afforded absolute 
immunity in D’Alessio irrespective of whether its actions were 
improper, undertaken in error, or provided the basis for 
D’Alessio’s fault.69 
Generally, courts afford SROs absolute immunity for actions 
taken pursuant to their prosecutorial or adjudicatory functions 
with little difficulty.70 The determination hinges, roughly, upon 
whether the conduct in question “share[d] . . . characteristics 
[with] the judicial process.”71 In contrast, determining what 
actions undertaken by an SRO are undertaken pursuant to its 
regulatory function as opposed to its nongovernmental private 
business interests can be far more problematic.72  
In Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of Securities 
Dealers,73 the Ninth Circuit determined that NASD was entitled 
to absolute immunity in the face of damage claims arising out of 
NASD’s decision to suspend trading and temporarily delist a 
company.74 The court determined that “NASD is charged with the 
duty and responsibility of monitoring its market carefully to 
protect the investing public [and] [w]hen it acts in this capacity to 
suspend trading, NASD is performing a regulatory function 
cloaked in immunity.”75 Sparta may be the most straightforward 
demonstration of the regulatory function. 
                                                                                                     
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
NYSE was afforded absolute immunity irrespective of whether the actions taken 
by the NYSE were improper, in error, or caused harm to D’Alessio). 
 70. See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
courts holding SROs absolutely immune for actions taken pursuant to their 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions). 
 71. Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 
1985) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510–13 (1978))). 
 72. See infra notes 73–164 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
courts finding SROs entitled to absolute immunity and denied absolute 
immunity for actions taken pursuant to their regulatory function). 
 73. 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 74. See id. at 1215 (“All of the damage Sparta claims flows from the trading 
suspension and temporary de-listing. Accordingly, defendants are immune from 
Sparta’s claims.”). 
 75. Id. 
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In Standard Investment Chartered, Inc. v. National Ass’n of 
Securities Dealers,76 two SROs, the NASD and the regulatory arm 
of the NYSE, consolidated to form the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA).77 FINRA was to be the sole 
regulator for the private members of both the NASD and the 
NYSE.78 NASD, as a condition of the consolidation, was required 
to amend its bylaws to bring them in conformity with the 
NYSE’s.79 Plaintiff asserted that the NASD, in its proxy 
statement for a shareholder vote related to the bylaw 
amendment, “falsely asserted that $35,000 was the maximum 
amount that NASD . . . was authorized by the Internal Revenue 
Service to pay members in connection with the merger.”80 In an 
effort to skirt NASD’s absolute immunity, the plaintiff argued 
that the action challenged pertained to an “alleged misstatement 
. . . related to [NASD’s] finances, not their regulatory functions.”81 
The Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) explicitly stated 
that the “attempt to parse the proxy [statement] in order to 
separate ‘financially-related’ statements from ‘regulatory-related’ 
statements is artificial and unconvincing.”82 The court 
determined that the focus on the financial component of the 
bylaws amendment missed the “entire purpose of the 
reorganization,” which was regulatory, and thus afforded 
absolute immunity.83 The district court found that “[i]t is patent 
that the consolidation that transferred NASD’s and NYSE’s 
regulatory powers to the resulting FINRA is, on its face, an 
exercise of the SROs’ delegated regulatory functions and thus 
entitled to absolute immunity.”84  
In a per curiam decision, the Second Circuit, in Standard 
Investment Chartered, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Securities 
                                                                                                     
 76. No. 07-CV-2014, 2010 WL 749844 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010), aff’d per 
curiam, 637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 77. Id. at *1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d 
112, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012). 
 80. Standard, 2010 WL 749844, at *1. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
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Dealers,85 affirmed the district court’s ruling that “the proxy 
solicitation, which was the only vehicle available to NASD for 
amending its bylaws, was plainly ‘incident to the exercise of 
regulatory power’ . . . and therefore an activity to which 
immunity attached.”86 The Second Circuit found significant 
(1) the fact that the NASD, as an SRO, cannot amend its rules 
without SEC approval and (2) the fact that the SEC retains 
discretion to amend the rules of any SRO, including the NASD.87 
In a precursor to the Standard decision, the Second Circuit, 
in In re NYSE Specialists Securities Litigation,88 ruled on 
whether absolute immunity protected the NYSE from either 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly permitting the Specialist 
Firms that operate on the NYSE to engage in improper trading 
on their own behalf to the detriment of public investors.89 The 
Specialist Firms play a pivotal role on the NYSE: each security 
listed for trading is assigned to a particular specialist firm and to 
“execute purchases and sales of a particular security, buyers or 
sellers must present their bids to buy and sell to the specific 
Specialist Firm assigned to that security.”90 Crucially, the 
Specialist Firm adjusts the price of the security to facilitate a 
liquid market in that security and correct imbalances in supply 
and demand.91 By virtue of the Specialist Firms’ unique 
middleman posture, they are in a position to improperly profit at 
                                                                                                     
 85. 637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 
(2012). 
 86. Id. at 116 (internal citations omitted). 
 87. See id. at 116–17 (“The statutory and regulatory framework highlights 
to us the extent to which an SRO’s bylaws are intimately intertwined with the 
regulatory powers delegated to SROs by the SEC and underscore our conviction 
that immunity attaches to the proxy solicitation here.”). 
 88. 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 89. See id. at 99 (determining whether “the Specialist Firms actively took 
advantage of their unique position to self-deal and [whether] the NYSE 
neglected or abandoned its regulatory duties and oversight of the Specialist 
Firms by permitting and in some cases encouraging blatant self-dealing”). 
 90. Id. at 92. 
 91. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 14 (“Adjusting prices to 
correct . . . imbalances of supply and demand is a critical task for the [S]pecialist 
[Firm].”). The Specialist Firm also plays a “central role in maintaining liquidity 
for that stock . . . [t]he specialist must sell when other investors are unwilling to 
sell and must buy when other investors are unwilling to buy.” Id. 
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the expense of the NYSE’s members.92 In the NYSE Specialists 
case, the plaintiffs alleged that the Specialist Firms did just that, 
in a variety of ways, with the possible intentional, knowing, or 
reckless permission of the NYSE.93  
The Second Circuit determined that the NYSE was entitled 
to absolute immunity in this instance because the claims related 
to the “proper functioning of the regulatory system[,]” and it was 
“clear that the[] claims all involved the NYSE’s action or inaction 
with respect to trading on the Exchange, which is indisputably 
within the NYSE’s regulatory powers.”94 The court stated that 
SROs are entitled to absolute immunity when they are “acting 
within the scope of the powers granted to them.”95 The court also 
noted that “the immunity protects the power to regulate, not the 
mandate to perform regulatory functions in a certain manner.”96 
With respect to the allegations that the NYSE “neglected or 
abandoned its regulatory duties and oversight,” the court 
explicitly stated that if the conduct of the SRO was “within the 
ambit of the SRO’s delegated power, immunity presumptively 
attaches, even where the SRO wrongly exercises that power.”97 The 
Second Circuit was again stating that even where an SRO is in 
the wrong, or acting improperly, the SRO will be entitled to 
absolute immunity so as long as the “allegations of misconduct” 
                                                                                                     
 92. See supra note 91, infra note 93, and accompanying text (illustrating 
the position and manner in which Specialist Firms can, and did, profit at the 
expense of the NYSE’s members). 
 93. See NYSE Specialists, 503 F.3d at 93 (noting that the Specialist Firms 
improperly engaged in interpositioning, trading ahead, freezing the book, and 
manipulating the tick). “[I]nterpositioning” means the Specialist Firms 
improperly positioned themselves between matching orders to make a profit for 
themselves. Id. “[T]rading ahead” means the Specialist Firms improperly 
undertook trades for their own accounts before undertaking trades for public 
investors that the Specialist Firm knew would impact the stock price and thus 
taking advantage of the Firm’s future insight into price movements. Id. 
“[F]reezing the book” means improperly freezing the disseminated prices for a 
security to permit the Specialist Firms to engage in trading for their own 
account before undertaking trades for public investors. Id. “[M]anipulating the 
‘tick’” means improperly changing the price of the security to affect its principal 
trades. Id. 
 94. Id. at 99–100 (internal citations omitted).  
 95. Id. at 98. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 93, 99 (emphasis added). 
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pertain to a “specific function” that is “‘consistent with’ the 
exercise of power delegated to the SRO.”98 
In DL Capital Group, LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.,99 
the Second Circuit afforded NASDAQ absolute immunity for 
suspending trading, canceling trades previously made, and 
announcing those decisions.100 Due to what NASDAQ believed 
was a system glitch, shares in Corinthian Colleges (COCO) 
dropped precipitously for no reason, falling from $57.45 to $38.45 
in twelve minutes.101 NASDAQ, in response to the large decline in 
stock price, suspended trading in the shares for an hour.102 Forty-
five minutes after resuming trading, NASDAQ announced that it 
was canceling all trades that took place in the twelve-minute 
stock price drop time period.103 DL Capital went long in the 
twelve-minute window (betting the stock price would eventually 
rise, which it did), and then sold its shares after trading resumed, 
but before NASDAQ announced the cancelation of trades, making 
a profit.104 DL Capital’s profit was converted into a loss when 
NASDAQ canceled the trades made during the twelve-minute 
window because it meant that DL Capital’s initial purchase of 
COCO was canceled but DL Capital’s sale was not.105 This 
resulted in an “uncovered short sale”106 whereby DL Capital had 
sold shares that it, after NASDAQ’s announcement and trade 
cancellation, did not own.107 DL Capital therefore had to purchase 
the requisite shares in the market, securing them at a price 
                                                                                                     
 98. Id. 
 99. 409 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 100. Id. at 96. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Uncovered Option, (2013) INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investo 
pedia.com/terms/u/uncovered-option.asp#axzz2KXF427vY (last visited Feb. 10, 
2013) (describing an uncovered option, which is similar to an uncovered short 
sale, as a transaction whereby the seller sells a security without owning the 
underlying security, and thus must go out into the market to purchase the 
security at market prices in order to complete the transaction) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 107. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 96 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
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higher than its sale price, leading to a loss.108 DL Capital thus 
alleged that it was injured “by having to cover the forced short 
sale at a loss.”109 
The Second Circuit ruled that NASDAQ’s actions were 
afforded absolute immunity as NASDAQ was engaged in actions 
“consistent with the quasi-governmental powers delegated to it by 
the NASD pursuant to the Exchange Act.”110 In DL Capital, the 
plaintiff attempted to bifurcate NASDAQ’s actions attacking “not 
Nasdaq’s regulatory decisions to suspend trading, resume 
trading, or cancel trades, but . . . the manner in which Nasdaq 
publicly announced those decisions.”111 The district court and the 
Second Circuit remained unconvinced, with the Second Circuit 
stating that “[a]s the district court aptly put it, ‘[a]nnouncing the 
suspension or cancellation of trades is as much a part of 
defendants’ regulatory duties as is the actual suspension or 
cancellation of trades.’”112  
The Second Circuit went on to state that “allegations of bad 
faith, malice and even fraud . . . cannot, except in the most 
unusual of circumstances, overcome absolute immunity.”113 It is 
clear that even the wrongful, improper, or errant performance of 
duties incidental to the performance of an SRO’s regulatory 
function will be protected by absolute immunity.114 This position 
establishes a high bar for plaintiffs to clear in suits brought 
against SROs in performance of their regulatory function.115 
SROs have been granted absolute immunity in a variety of 
situations and circumstances. SROs have been granted absolute 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 99–100. 
 111. Id. at 98. 
 112. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 113. Id.; see also Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 
2d 260, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the Second Circuit has extended 
absolute immunity to actions alleging fraud and bad faith by both individual 
investors and members of the SRO), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 114. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text (explaining how courts 
afford absolute immunity for actions incidental to the performance of an SRO’s 
regulatory function).  
 115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting the Second Circuit’s 
position that even actions undertaken fraudulently, in bad faith, and with 
malice warrant absolute immunity). 
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immunity for (1) disciplining members and associates of the 
exchange;116 (2) disciplining employees of exchange members;117 
(3) deciding to suspend trading and delist a company from the 
exchange;118 (4) deciding to ban a trader from the NYSE floor;119 
(5) interpreting securities laws and regulations as applied to 
exchange members;120 (6) referring exchange members to the SEC 
and other governmental agencies for civil and criminal 
enforcement under the securities laws;121 (7) suspending trading, 
canceling previous trades made, and announcing such 
decisions;122 and (8) “amend[ing] . . . [their] bylaws where . . . the 
amendments are inextricable from the SRO’s role as a 
regulator.”123 In the above cases, the courts invariably concluded 
that, when objectively considering the nature and function of the 
action at issue, the action was undertaken pursuant to the quasi-
                                                                                                     
 116. See Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 
692 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he NASD is entitled to absolute immunity for its role in 
disciplining its members and associates.”). 
 117. See Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(recognizing “an absolute immunity from suits for money damages with respect 
to the Exchange’s conduct of disciplinary proceedings” against an employee of an 
exchange member). 
 118. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 
1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (“NASD is charged with the duty and responsibility of 
monitoring its market carefully to protect the investing public. When it acts in 
this capacity to suspend trading, [or delist a company from exchange] NASD is 
performing a regulatory function cloaked in immunity.”). 
 119. See D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104–06 (2d Cir. 
2001) (noting that “[b]ecause these actions ‘share the characteristics of the 
judicial process’ the NYSE is entitled to immunity from suit for claims based on 
these actions” (quoting Barbara, 99 F.3d at 59)). 
 120. See id. (noting that SROs stand in the shoes of the SEC when 
“interpreting the securities laws for its members and in monitoring compliance 
with those laws,” and thus the SROs should be afforded the same immunity as 
the SEC when performing those functions delegated to it by the SEC). 
 121. See id. (noting that an SRO is entitled to immunity when it acts 
pursuant to its “quasi-prosecutorial” function). 
 122. See DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 97–
100 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting, in support, the district court, which stated that 
“[a]nnouncing the suspension or cancellation of trades is as much a part of 
defendants’ regulatory duties as is the actual suspension or cancellation of 
trades” (quoting DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. 03-CV-
9730, 2004 WL 993109, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004))). 
 123. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d 
112, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012). 
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governmental prosecutorial, regulatory, or adjudicatory function 
of the SRO, and thus warranting absolute immunity.124 
The courts are highly deferential in affording SROs absolute 
immunity for their actions.125 Austin, Barbara, D’Alessio, Sparta 
Surgical, Standard Investment Chartered, NYSE Specialists, DL 
Capital, and Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.126 all 
contain instances of courts affording absolute immunity to SROs 
for actions taken pursuant to their prosecutorial, regulatory, or 
adjudicatory functions in addition to, in some cases, actions 
incidental to such functions.127 SROs were afforded absolute 
immunity when they performed their quasi-governmental 
functions abusively,128 improperly and in error (and irrespective 
of the harm caused to others who may have detrimentally relied 
upon the SROs error),129 wrongfully,130 in bad faith, with malice, 
and even fraudulently.131 As noted by the court in Dexter, 
“absolute immunity must be absolute” and even conduct 
“incorrect and[/or] unlawful . . . is nevertheless protected” 
irrespective of how “badly motivated, inept, or even unlawful” the 
SRO’s conduct might have been.132 Given the diverse nature of 
                                                                                                     
 124. See supra notes 116–23 and accompanying text (detailing various 
situations in which SROs have been afforded absolute immunity). 
 125. See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing various situations in which SROs have 
been afforded absolute immunity upon a variety of claims). 
 126. 406 F. Supp. 2d 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 127. See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing various situations in which SROs have 
been afforded absolute immunity upon a variety of claims). 
 128. See Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its 
governmental function even when performed abusively). 
 129. See D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions taken pursuant to its 
governmental function when performed improperly, even when the SRO 
allegedly caused harm to others who relied upon the SRO’s improper actions), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001). 
 130. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its 
governmental function even when wrongfully exercising its power). 
 131. See DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 98 
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that absolute immunity for an SRO cannot be overcome by 
bad faith, malice, or even fraud). 
 132. Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263, 
264 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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actions afforded absolute immunity and the strength of the 
absolute immunity itself, it seems difficult to imagine instances 
in which courts would not grant SROs absolute immunity, yet 
immunity has been denied in certain circumstances. 
2. Actions Denied Absolute Immunity 
In Weissman v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, the 
Eleventh Circuit denied absolute immunity to NASDAQ.133 In 
Weissman, NASDAQ asserted absolute immunity for any liability 
arising from the active promotion of NASDAQ, and several 
companies listed on it, including WorldCom.134 The 
advertisements, which were detrimentally relied upon by an 
investor, specifically referenced NASDAQ’s belief in the need for 
the companies listed on NASDAQ to “provide accurate financial 
reporting in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounted [sic] 
Principals (‘GAAP’)” and for the companies to be “‘supported by a 
Knowledgeable Audit Committee.’”135 The advertisement also 
provided a list of companies that supposedly endorsed this 
opinion, including WorldCom.136 It was alleged that at the time of 
the advertisements, NASDAQ was aware that WorldCom was not 
in compliance with NASDAQ’s audit committee requirements.137 
WorldCom collapsed within months after the advertisements 
were promulgated in a massive “accounting scandal that created 
billions in illusory earnings,” almost completely wiping out the 
plaintiff’s investment.138  
                                                                                                     
 133. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s denial of absolute immunity as 
NASDAQ’s activity did not serve an adjudicatory, regulatory, or prosecutorial 
function). 
 134. See id. at 1298–99 (noting that pursuant to “NASDAQ’s view, even 
advertisements that promote the sale of a particular stock and serve no 
regulatory function whatsoever would be shielded by absolute immunity, 
because advertisements are ‘consistent with’ NASDAQ’s role as an SRO”). 
 135. Id. at 1299. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 05–61107, 2004 WL 
3395190, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2004), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 468 F.3d 
1306 (11th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 500 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 138. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The Overview; 
WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2002), 
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The Eleventh Circuit, reversing itself en banc, stated that 
absolute immunity is “appropriate only when an SRO is 
preforming regulatory, adjudicatory, or prosecutorial functions 
that would otherwise be performed by a government agency” and 
that “absolute immunity must be coterminous with an SRO’s 
performance of a governmental function.”139 In this instance, the 
court determined that the advertisements were private business 
activity, and “‘[w]hen conducting private business, [SROs] remain 
subject to liability.’”140 Therefore, in this instance, NASDAQ was 
not afforded absolute immunity.141 The court specifically stated 
that “NASDAQ represents no one but itself when it entices 
investors to trade on its exchange and, specifically, when it 
suggests that particular companies are sound investments.”142 
The court was clear that activities undertaken “in the service of 
NASDAQ’s own business, not the government’s” do not warrant 
absolute immunity.143  
It may appear that NASDAQ’s actions were unquestionably 
undertaken pursuant to its nongovernmental private business 
interests. As the Eleventh Circuit itself stated, SRO’s are not 
entitled to absolute immunity for “such distinctly 
nongovernmental conduct” as advertising.144 The result in 
Weissman, however, followed a tortuous journey through the 
lower courts wherein the Eleventh Circuit reversed itself.145 In 
the district court, NASDAQ’s motion to dismiss pursuant to 
absolute immunity was denied.146 NASDAQ appealed to a panel 
                                                                                                     
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-world 
com-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html?src=pm (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Weissman, 2004 WL 
3395190, at *1 (describing the fall of WorldCom as a “well publicized accounting 
fraud and collapse”). 
 139. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
 140. Id. at 1299 (quoting Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 
159 F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 141. See id. at 1299 (concluding that NASDAQ’s actions were not protected 
by absolute immunity in this case). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1295. 
 146. See id. (“The district court denied the motion in all respects.”). 
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of the Eleventh Circuit that reversed the denial of absolute 
immunity in part and affirmed it in part.147 Finally, the Eleventh 
Circuit, en banc, “affirm[ed] the district court’s determination 
that NASDAQ does not enjoy immunity for the conduct alleged,” 
overruling the previous Eleventh Circuit panel decision.148  
Weissman demonstrates how, even in what appears to be a 
clear-cut case of an SRO performing functions that were 
undertaken pursuant to its nongovernmental private business 
interests, the courts struggle with separating those private 
actions from actions undertaken pursuant to an SRO’s regulatory 
function.149 Weissman also demonstrates how hesitant the courts 
are to find an SRO exposed to any sort of liability.150 Every single 
one of the cases cited by Weissman that addresses SRO liability in 
the financial sphere found the SRO entitled to absolute 
immunity.151 This illustrates the protection afforded to SROs 
such as NASDAQ in the financial context.  
Weissman is the only circuit level opinion in which an SRO in 
the financial sphere is denied absolute immunity. Widening the 
search parameters to federal district courts reveals only one case, 
not including the Weissman district court opinion, in which an 
SRO in the financial sphere was denied absolute immunity.152 In 
                                                                                                     
 147. See id. (noting that the Eleventh Circuit panel “reversed the district 
court’s denial of absolute immunity with regard to . . . portions of Weissman’s 
complaint . . . but affirmed the denial of absolute immunity with regard to the 
remainder of Weissman’s complaint”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text (describing the 
procedural history of Weissman, wherein the Eleventh Circuit reversed itself). 
 150. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text (noting how a final 
result was reached only after the Eleventh Circuit reversed itself). 
 151. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293 passim (11th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc). In one instance, Zandford v. National Ass’n of Securities 
Dealers, the D.C. Circuit remanded the absolute immunity question to its 
district court. Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 94-7058, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 41840, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 1996) (per curiam) (remanding “to 
the district court for reconsideration of whether, and to what extent, the alleged 
misconduct . . . may be shielded by absolute immunity”). The district court 
determined that the SRO’s actions were protected by absolute immunity and, 
even if they were not, the plaintiff’s claims were time barred; the circuit court 
affirmed. Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18, 24 
(D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 221 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 152. See Opulent Fund, L.P. v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. C-07-03683, 
2007 WL 3010573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007) (denying NASDAQ absolute 
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Opulent Fund v. Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.,153 the Northern 
District of California denied NASDAQ absolute immunity.154 
In Opulent, the plaintiffs were private investment 
partnerships trading in stock options on the Nasdaq-100.155 On 
the day in question, plaintiffs alleged that NASDAQ 
miscalculated the value of the Nasdaq-100.156 Plaintiffs 
determined this based upon their own calculation of the value of 
the Nasdaq-100 using the NOOP of the underlying stocks.157 This 
miscalculation had a significant impact on the plaintiffs’ portfolio 
of options, causing the plaintiffs to suffer a far greater loss on 
their contracts than if the value of the index had been correctly 
calculated.158  
The Opulent court agreed with the plaintiffs that “pricing an 
index is not a ‘regulatory function’ and therefore not cloaked in 
absolute immunity.”159 The court felt that NASDAQ established 
this index to profit from the selling of market price data and that 
in doing so, NASDAQ “‘represent[ed] no one but itself.’”160 The 
court stated that “Nasdaq’s duty to accurately calculate and 
disseminate an index price does not function to protect investors; 
instead, Nasdaq’s actions function to create a market and 
                                                                                                     
immunity). 
 153. No. C-07-03683, 2007 WL 3010573 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007). 
 154. See id. at *5 (“Nasdaq’s market facilitating actions at issue in this case 
were non-regulatory, and hence there is no absolute immunity.”). 
 155. Id. at *1 
The Nasdaq-100 is an index of the one-hundred largest non-financial 
securities traded on the Nasdaq Exchange. The index is weighted by 
the market value of each of the 100 component securities, whose 
values depend on their NASDAQ Official Opening Price (“NOOP”). 
The SEC has reviewed and approved the structure of the Nasdaq-100 
index . . . . The SEC also approved Nasdaq’s calculation and 
publication of NOOP prices. Nasdaq encourages investors to use the 
Nasdaq-100 index to create derivatives, and the accurate and timely 
reporting of the index’s value is critical to the existence of the market 
for Nasdaq-100 derivatives. 
(internal citations omitted). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at *5. 
 160. Id. (citing Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 
(11th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
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increase trading.”161 Importantly, the court stated that “SEC 
approval of a rule imposing a duty on an SRO is not the sine qua 
non of SRO immunity; engaging in regulatory conduct is.”162 
Furthermore, the court noted that the fact that “the SEC 
approved the pricing formula against which Nasdaq’s conduct 
will be judged does not automatically convert Nasdaq’s conduct 
into an immunized ‘regulatory function.’”163 Ultimately, the court 
ruled that NASDAQ’s “market facilitating actions at issue in this 
case were non-regulatory” and therefore, NASDAQ was not 
entitled to absolute immunity.164 
The Opulent court affirmatively stated that even if the SEC 
has approved the specific methods employed by the SRO, or if the 
SEC has approved the imposition of duties upon the SRO, that 
does not mean that the SRO’s actions employing those methods or 
preforming those duties are regulatory functions warranting 
absolute immunity.165 This is significant because during the 
Facebook IPO, like in Opulent, a system approved by the SEC 
and employed by NASDAQ—the Nasdaq Cross—failed, causing 
harm to others.166 Likewise, the SEC approved NASD’s 
delegation of authority to NASDAQ, to “operate and oversee” the 
NASDAQ stock market in 1997.167  
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (detailing how, per 
Opulent, the approval of the SEC does not unequivocally convert approved 
actions into regulatory conduct). 
 166. See infra notes 219–22 and accompanying text (noting that the 
NASDAQ Cross was approved by the SEC); infra Part III.A (detailing the events 
of the Facebook IPO). 
 167. See Order Approving the Plan of Allocation and Delegation of Functions 
by NASD to Subsidiaries, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39326, 62 Fed. Reg. 
62,385, 62,391 (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter NASD Delegation Order] (approving 
the delegation of authority from the NASD to NASDAQ to “operate and oversee” 
the NASDAQ stock market). 
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3. Absolute Immunity and SROs—The Tests Employed 
Aside from Weissman, Opulent, and the occasional lower 
state court,168 the courts have found SROs entitled to absolute 
immunity.169 The lack of cases in which courts have denied SROs 
absolute immunity is a testament to the breadth of protection 
afforded to SROs by their absolute immunity.170 As Weissman 
and Opulent make clear, however, SROs will not always be 
afforded absolute immunity.171  
As was demonstrated above in Standard Investment 
Chartered, NYSE Specialists, DL Capital, Dexter, Weissman, and 
Opulent, the courts resort to vague language when determining 
whether an SRO was acting pursuant to its regulatory function or 
a nongovernmental private business interest.172 Courts will 
inquire as to whether the SRO was acting “coterminous with 
[the] . . . performance of a governmental function”;173 acting 
“‘incident to the exercise of regulatory power’”;174 “acting within 
the scope of the powers granted to them”;175 acting “consistent 
with the quasi-governmental powers delegated to [the SRO]”;176 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund, Ltd. P’ship v. Chi. Bd. 
Options Exch., 976 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 981 
N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. 2012) (denying SRO defendants absolute immunity). 
 169. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded 
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of 
claims). 
 170. See supra Part II.B.2 (providing examples of SROs being denied 
absolute immunity). 
 171. See supra notes 133–64 and accompanying text (detailing the court’s 
refusal to find the actions of the SROs in Weissman and Opulent entitled to 
absolute immunity). 
 172. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded 
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of 
claims). 
 173. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
 174. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d 
112, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012) (citing 
In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 175. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 176. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 99–100 
(2d Cir. 2005). But see Weissman, 500 F.3d 1298 (rejecting the proposition that 
an SRO is granted absolute immunity for “all activity that is merely ‘consistent 
with’” the SROs delegated powers). 
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acting in such a way that “the conduct “ar[ose] out of the 
discharge of [the SRO’s] duties under the Exchange Act”;177 and 
whether or not the SRO was acting in such a way that it 
“represent[ed] no one but itself.’”178 The various, equally vague 
standards suggest that a coherent method for determining 
whether an SRO’s actions were undertaken pursuant to its 
regulatory function or pursuant to its nongovernmental private 
business interests would prove beneficial.179 The approach 
detailed in Part IV intends to clarify this ambiguity.180  
III. NASDAQ’s Conditional Absolute Immunity in Light of the 
Facebook IPO 
As Part II has demonstrated, courts have little difficulty 
identifying when SROs are acting pursuant to their prosecutorial 
and adjudicatory functions.181 Courts, however, struggle to 
determine when SROs are acting pursuant to their regulatory 
function as opposed to their private, for-profit business 
interests.182  
The Facebook IPO illustrates the complexity of applying 
these vague standards to complicated actual events to ascertain 
whether the SRO in question, NASDAQ, was acting pursuant to 
its regulatory function or was acting pursuant to its 
                                                                                                     
 177. Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104 (2d 
Cir. 2001), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 
(2001)). 
 178. Opulent Fund, L.P. v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. C-07-03683, 2007 
WL 3010573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007) (quoting Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of 
Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 179. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded 
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of 
claims). 
 180. See infra Part IV.A (detailing the new approach). 
 181. See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
SROs afforded absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions). 
 182. See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
the vague language courts resort to when determining whether an SRO was 
acting pursuant to its regulatory function or a nongovernmental private 
business interest). 
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nongovernmental private business interests. Part III, in subpart 
A, provides a very brief narrative of the Facebook IPO.183 Subpart 
B applies the present law of SRO absolute immunity to 
NASDAQ’s conduct during the Facebook IPO in an attempt to 
determine if NASDAQ is entitled to absolute immunity. 
A. The Events of the Facebook IPO 
NASDAQ establishes the opening price of an IPO through a 
process known as the “Nasdaq Cross” (Cross).184 The Cross 
process begins at 7:00 A.M. on the day of the IPO, and from then 
on, NASDAQ accepts orders for shares in the IPO.185 Those orders 
can be entered or canceled freely, although no information on the 
orders is publically disseminated until the “Display-Only Period,” 
and no orders are actually completed until the Cross itself 
executes.186 The Display-Only Period begins fifteen minutes prior 
to the scheduled release time of the IPO, which in the case of 
Facebook was 11:00 A.M.187 During the Display-Only Period, 
NASDAQ disseminates information about the auction price and 
the auction volume on NASDAQ’s public data feeds at five-second 
intervals.188 During this period, members of NASDAQ may 
continue to enter and cancel orders in the IPO.189 “Over the 
course of the Display-only period, market participants develop an 
understanding of the state of supply and demand, changes in the 
indicative price typically become smaller, and the indicative 
volume typically increases.”190 After the Display-Only Period has 
                                                                                                     
 183. For a detailed description of NASDAQ’s IPO process and the specific 
issues NASDAQ faced during the Facebook IPO see NASDAQ Proposal, supra 
note 17. This level of detail is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 184. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,708–09. 
 185. Id. at 45,708. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 45,708–09. 
 188. Id. at 45,708. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. NASDAQ can extend the Display-Only Period up to six times, each 
for five-minute increments. Id. NASDAQ would do so if it “detect[ed] an order 
imbalance in the security,” which would be determined if the current reference 
price disseminated by NASDAQ differed by more than 5% or $0.50 in the fifteen 
seconds before the Cross executed or “all buy or sell market orders w[ould] not 
be executed in the [C]ross.” NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, Rule 4120 (c)(7)(C). 
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come to an end, the “IPO [C]ross executes, the Nasdaq official 
opening price is disseminated, a bulk trade” is executed, and 
messages confirming individual executions for Cross-executed 
shares are sent to market participants.191 The Cross calculates 
the execution price by “determining the price that will maximize 
the number of shares executed and, in the case of multiple prices 
providing the same maximum number of shares executed, 
selecting the price nearest to the offering price.”192 
On the day of the Facebook IPO, the Cross failed to execute 
correctly, falling into a continuous loop of calculations and 
recalculations. At 11:05:10 A.M., NASDAQ attempted to 
“conclude the quoting period, execute the Cross and print the 
opening trade,” a procedure that, when initiated, results in the 
Cross application running its final calculation to match buy and 
sell orders and then formulating the opening trade.193 The system 
is designed to capture changes to the existing orders even while 
the system is calculating the Cross up until one second before the 
Cross is completed, incorporating the changes made while the 
calculation for the Cross is being processed.194 In the Facebook 
IPO, however, the system got stuck in a continuous loop: “after 
the initial calculation of the Cross was completed, but before the 
opening trade was printed, additional order modifications were 
                                                                                                     
Limit Up-Limit Down Plan and Trading Halts, NASDAQ OMX (June 13, 2006), 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednod
e=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequ
ityrules%2F (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter NASDAQ Stock Market 
Rules] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 191. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,708. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.; See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 
1 and 2 Thereto to Establish the Nasdaq Halt Cross, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-53488, 71 Fed. Reg. 14,272, 14,274 (Mar. 21, 2006) (SR-NASD-2006-015) 
[hereinafter Proposal for NASDAQ Cross] (describing the NASDAQ Cross as 
capable of processing further changes to the existing orders while the system is 
processing within one second of the final calculation should the changes exceed 
a predetermined threshold or variance). But see Letter from Daniel Keegan, 
Managing Dir., Citigroup Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Citi Comment Letter] (stating that the 
NASDAQ Cross system, which “continued to accept cancels and modifications to 
orders up to one second before the opening [C]ross,” contained a “known design 
flaw that resulted in a similar technology issue dating back to Fall 2011”), 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/CitiCommentLetter.pdf. 
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received by the system . . . . As designed, the system re-calculated 
the Cross to factor in the new state of the book.”195 As the Cross 
was recalculating, new changes were again received by the 
system, and, after the recalculation was completed but before the 
opening trade was printed, the system again recalculated the 
Cross to incorporate the received changes.196 Thus, the system fell 
into a continuous loop of recalculations.197 
NASDAQ, after a “system modification,” was able to break 
the continuous cycle and complete the Cross at 11:30:09 A.M, 
twenty-five minutes late.198 But, “only orders received prior to 
11:11:00 a.m. participated in the 11:30:09 a.m. Cross.”199 Thus, 
any orders “entered between 11:11:00 a.m. and 11:30:09 a.m.” 
were neither calculated in the 11:30:09 a.m. Cross nor executed 
by NASDAQ.200 Robert Greifeld, NASDAQ OMX Group’s Chief 
Executive Officer, stated that “[a]s many as 30 million shares 
worth of trading were affected by the glitch.”201  
As a result of its “system modification,” NASDAQ was not 
disseminating transaction confirmation messages (order 
confirmations).202 NASDAQ did not transmit transaction 
confirmation messages until 1:50 P.M., over two hours after the 
market for Facebook had opened.203 NASDAQ believed that, “[i]n 
spite of the absence of confirmation messages[,]” market 
participants would have been largely unaffected by the 
absence.204 Citi, on the other hand, believed that the lack of 
                                                                                                     
 195. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,709. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Jenny Strasburg, Jacob Bunge & Gina Chon, Nadaq’s Facebook 
Problem, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052702303610504577416530447015656.html (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2013) (noting how the CEO of NASDAQ described the IPO as not 
NASDAQ’s “finest hour”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 202. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,709.  
 203. Id.; see also Citi Comment Letter, supra note 194, at 7 (“In the period 
between 11:30 a.m. and 1:50 p.m. . . . system issues prevented Nasdaq from 
disseminating Cross transaction reports.” (citation omitted)). 
 204. See NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,709 (“[M]arket 
participants . . . would reasonably have had certain expectations for the 
execution or non-execution of their orders.” (emphasis added)). 
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transaction confirmation messages meant that “legions of 
investors were unable to make rational trading decisions because 
they had no idea whether they owned Facebook stock or not.”205 
UBS concurred, stating that of its losses “in excess of $350 
million, the vast majority . . . resulted directly from Nasdaq’s 
unprecedented failure to deliver execution reports for tens of 
thousands of trades executed in the opening [C]ross [of] the 
Facebook IPO.”206 Citi believed that the lack of transaction 
confirmation messages resulted in “investors submitting multiple 
redundant orders based on the belief that the orders were not 
going through. . . . In other cases, investors submitted 
cancellations [for their purchase orders] before receiving order 
confirmations, but were stuck with the stock.”207 Other 
individuals were affected by the lack of transaction confirmation 
messages, and they were left wondering whether they owned any 
Facebook shares at all: “People didn’t know where their orders 
stood, and it became a big guessing game.”208 It was even 
reported that some brokerages, four days after the IPO, “weren’t 
sure if some of their orders had closed, or at what price.”209 
                                                                                                     
 205. Citi Comment Letter, supra note 194, at 7. 
 206. Letter from Mark Shelton, Gen. Counsel UBS Americas, UBS AG, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, at 2 (Aug. 22, 2012) 
[hereinafter UBS Comment Letter] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 207. Citi Comment Letter, supra note 194, at 7. 
 208. Hibah Yousuf, Facebook Trader: Nasdaq “Blew it,” CNN MONEY (May 
21, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/21/markets/facebook-
nasdaq/index.htm?iid=EL (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Strasburg, Bunge & Chon, supra 
note 201 (“Brokers and traders who placed orders [between 11:11:00 a.m. and 
11:30:09 a.m.] didn’t know the status of those transactions until 1:50 p.m.”). 
Some brokers, traders, and investors “said they had put in orders to sell shares 
early in the day, but those orders didn’t go through. By the time they discovered 
that in the afternoon, the share price had fallen, so they were able to sell only at 
the lower price.” Id. Others “said that because they didn’t have confirmations of 
their earlier buy orders from Nasdaq, they weren’t able to sell those shares until 
after 1:50 p.m.” after the share price had fallen. Id. Still others stated that 
“orders . . . didn’t go through, or were filled at an inferior price later in the 
day . . . [or] went through [but] weren’t confirmed until hours later.” Pepitone, 
supra note 9. “That left investors unsure about how many shares they bought or 
sold, and at what price.” Id. 
 209. Pepitone, supra note 9. 
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B. The Present Law Applied to NASDAQ’s Conduct During the 
Facebook IPO 
To be afforded absolute immunity, NASDAQ must 
demonstrate that the actions it took during the Facebook IPO 
were within its quasi-governmental prosecutorial, regulatory, or 
adjudicatory functions.210 Because the actions NASDAQ took to 
effectuate the Facebook IPO do not “share . . . characteristics 
[with] the judicial process,” NASDAQ did not act pursuant to its 
adjudicatory or prosecutorial functions.211 Therefore, the inquiry 
pertains solely to whether NASDAQ acted pursuant to its 
regulatory function. Even if effectuating IPOs is within 
NASDAQ’s regulatory function, NASDAQ’s actions during the 
Facebook IPO should be analyzed to determine if they are 
entitled to absolute immunity.212 
1. The Argument for Absolute Immunity 
To prevail on a claim of absolute immunity, NASDAQ must 
demonstrate that (1) IPOs are an exercise of its quasi-
governmental regulatory function and (2) that NASDAQ’s actions 
during the Facebook IPO, however characterized, warrant 
absolute immunity.213  
a. IPOs Constitute a Regulatory Function 
NASDAQ could argue that IPOs are undertaken pursuant to 
its regulatory function given the extensive regulatory authority 
delegated to NASDAQ by the NASD (approved by the SEC), the 
                                                                                                     
 210. See supra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of SROs afforded absolute 
immunity for actions taken pursuant to their prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and 
regulatory functions). 
 211. Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 
1985) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510–13 (1978))). 
 212. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded 
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of 
claims). 
 213. See supra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of SROs being afforded 
absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims). 
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SEC’s explicit approval of the NASDAQ Cross (the system 
NASDAQ uses to effectuate IPOs), and the breadth of regulatory 
authority provided by Congress to NASDAQ as a national 
securities exchange.214 The strength of each argument is analyzed 
in turn. 
In 1997 NASDAQ was given “sole responsibility to operate 
and oversee the Nasdaq market.”215 NASDAQ was authorized to 
“develop, operate, and maintain the Nasdaq Stock Market, to 
formulate regulatory policies and listing criteria for the Nasdaq 
Stock Market, and to enforce those policies and rules.”216  
The breadth of authority delegated to NASDAQ to oversee 
the NASDAQ stock market, and the fact that NASDAQ had “sole 
responsibility” to do so, provides support for the assertion that 
part of the regulatory function conferred to NASDAQ was the 
effectuation of IPOs.217 After all, the only way to grow or even 
maintain a stock market is to add companies to it via IPOs.218 
Furthermore, the SEC explicitly approved the 
implementation of the NASDAQ Cross—the system employed by 
NASDAQ to effectuate IPOs.219 The proposal pertaining to the 
implementation of the NASDAQ Cross described the various 
ways in which the Cross would impact the effectuation of IPOs.220 
The Commission’s approval of the very system employed by 
NASDAQ to effectuate IPOs generally, and the Facebook IPO 
specifically, provides evidence that the Commission approved of 
NASDAQ’s role in developing and building the NASDAQ stock 
                                                                                                     
 214. Infra notes 215–27 and accompanying text. 
 215. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167. 
 216. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 217. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167. 
 218. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 190, at Rule 3351(i) 
(“Trading Practice”) (“No member or person associated with a member shall 
execute or cause to be executed, directly or indirectly, on Nasdaq a transaction 
in a security subject to an initial public offering until such security has first 
opened for trading on the national securities exchange . . . .”). 
 219. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Establish the Nasdaq 
Halt Cross, Exchange Act Release No. 34-53687, 71 Fed. Reg. 24,878 (Apr. 27, 
2006) (SR-NASD-2006-015) [hereinafter NASDAQ Cross Approval] (approving 
the implementation of the NASDAQ Cross). 
 220. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim. 
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market through IPOs.221 It is clear that the SEC was not only 
aware of, but approved of, NASDAQ effectuating IPOs on the 
NASDAQ stock market.222 
Finally, NASDAQ, as a national securities exchange, is 
required to “promote just and equitable principles of trade,” 
“facilitat[e] transactions in securities,” “remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a 
national market system,” and “protect investors and the public 
interest.”223  
Arguably, IPOs accomplish all four objectives. IPOs promote 
just and equitable principles of trade and facilitate transactions 
in securities generally, as well as those within a particular 
company, because what other process “remove[s] impediments to 
and perfect[s] the mechanism of a free and open market” like a 
company “going public”—allowing the average investor to freely 
“trade” and take a stake in a, previously unavailable, company?224 
IPOs also trigger mandatory disclosure obligations for companies 
listed on national securities exchanges.225 This “protect[s] 
investors and the public interest,” because more information 
about a company is now available to the market.226 The Second 
Circuit, in reference to the NYSE, an SRO comparable to 
NASDAQ, stated that all “action or inaction with respect to 
trading on the Exchange . . . is indisputably within the [SRO’s] 
regulatory powers.”227  
                                                                                                     
 221. See NASDAQ Cross Approval, supra note 219, at 24,878–79 (approving 
the implementation of the NASDAQ Cross). In adopting the Cross, the SEC 
stated that it was “consistent with the requirements of the [Securities 
Exchange] Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national 
securities association.” Id. 
 222. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim (referencing 
the various ways in which the Cross would affect IPOs); NASDAQ Cross 
Approval, supra note 219, at 24,878–79 (approving the NASDAQ Cross). 
 223. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012). 
 224. Id.; see CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 392 (noting how IPOs have 
“downside[s] for the company’s pre-existing owners[:] bringing in more equity 
owners dilutes the potential upside return”). 
 225. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 169 (noting how “Congress 
adopted mandatory disclosure for companies with securities listed on a national 
securities exchange as part of the Exchange Act of 1934”). 
 226. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5). 
 227. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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Therefore, NASDAQ can argue that IPOs constitute a 
regulatory function of NASDAQ and NASDAQ, when effectuating 
IPOs, may warrant absolute immunity.228 
b. NASDAQ’s Actions in Effectuating the Facebook IPO Warrant 
Absolute Immunity 
NASDAQ’s actions during the Facebook IPO, however 
characterized, will not forfeit NASDAQ’s absolute immunity: 
“absolute immunity must be absolute.”229 
Absolute immunity protects SROs even when they perform 
their quasi-governmental functions abusively,230 improperly and 
in error (irrespective of the harm caused to others who may have 
detrimentally relied upon the SRO’s error),231 wrongfully,232 in 
bad faith, with malice, and even fraudulently.233 As noted in 
Dexter, conduct “incorrect and[/or] unlawful . . . is nevertheless 
protected” by absolute immunity irrespective of how “badly 
motivated, inept, or even unlawful” the SRO’s conduct might 
have been.234 Absolute immunity even covers actions taken 
incidental to the performance of an SRO’s regulatory function if 
performed wrongfully, improperly, or errantly.235 
                                                                                                     
 228. Supra notes 215–27 and accompanying text. 
 229. Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 230. See Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to their 
governmental function even when performed abusively). 
 231. See D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its 
governmental function even when performed improperly and, even when the 
SRO, allegedly, caused harm to others who relied upon the SROs improper 
actions), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001). 
 232. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its 
governmental function even when wrongly exercising its power). 
 233. See DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 98 
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that absolute immunity for an SRO cannot be overcome by 
bad faith, malice, or even fraud). 
 234. Dexter, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
 235. See DL Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 98 (affording absolute immunity for 
actions incidental to the performance of an SRO’s regulatory function even when 
performed wrongfully, improperly, or errantly). 
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NASDAQ’s actions during the Facebook IPO could arguably 
be characterized as wrongful, improper, incorrect, badly 
motivated, or inept.236 But even if NASDAQ’s actions, undertaken 
pursuant to its regulatory function,237 were so characterized, 
NASDAQ would still be afforded absolute immunity.238 
NASDAQ’s actions probably could not, even arguably, be 
characterized as abusive, undertaken in bad faith, with malice, 
fraudulently, or unlawfully.239 And if NASDAQ’s actions were so 
characterized, NASDAQ would still be afforded absolute 
immunity.240 Given the extent to which courts have afforded 
SROs absolute immunity, despite the manner in which the SROs 
have performed their quasi-governmental functions, it is clear 
that NASDAQ’s actions, which could be characterized in a 
number of ways, would warrant absolute immunity.241 
Therefore, NASDAQ could argue that an IPO, in general, is 
an exercise of its quasi-governmental regulatory function 
warranting absolute immunity.242 NASDAQ should then be able 
to assert confidently that the actions taken, or not taken, by it 
during the Facebook IPO, however characterized, would warrant 
absolute immunity.243 
                                                                                                     
 236. See supra Part III.A (detailing the events of the Facebook IPO). 
 237. See supra Part III.B.1.a (arguing that the effectuation of IPOs is 
pursuant to NASDAQ’s regulatory function). 
 238. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be 
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as wrongful, 
improper, incorrect, badly motivated, or inept). 
 239. See supra Part III.A (detailing the events of the Facebook IPO). 
 240. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be 
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as abusive, 
undertaken in bad faith, undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful). 
 241. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be 
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as wrongful, 
improper, incorrect, badly motivated, inept, abusive, undertaken in bad faith, 
undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful). 
 242. See supra Part III.B.1.a (demonstrating that the effectuation of IPOs is 
pursuant to NASDAQ’s regulatory function and therefore warrants absolute 
immunity). 
 243. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be 
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as wrongful, 
improper, incorrect, badly motivated, inept, abusive, undertaken in bad faith, 
undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful). 
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2. The Argument Against Absolute Immunity 
NASDAQ will be denied absolute immunity if the 
effectuation of IPOs is found to constitute a private, for-profit 
business activity.244 The SEC itself acknowledges that “[a]s 
competition among markets grows, the markets that SROs 
operate will continue to come under increased pressure to attract 
order flow. . . . [The resulting] business pressure can create a 
strong conflict between the SRO[’s] regulatory and market 
operations functions.”245 
a. IPOs Constitute a Private, For-Profit Business Activity 
It could be argued that the effectuation of IPOs constitutes a 
private, for-profit business activity of NASDAQ given the positive 
effect IPOs have on NASDAQ’s bottom line and its “trading and 
brand value.”246 
NASDAQ aggressively solicited Facebook to have Facebook 
IPO on the NASDAQ stock market as opposed to the NYSE.247 To 
do so made business and financial sense: At stake was NASDAQ’s 
                                                                                                     
 244. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc) (“‘When conducting private business, [SROs] remain subject to 
liability.’” (quoting Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 
1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998))). Activities undertaken “in the service of NASDAQ’s 
own business, not the government’s,” do not warrant absolute immunity. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1296 n.4 (quoting Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, 
SEC Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,261–62 (Dec. 8, 2004)) 
(emphasis added). 
 246. See Whitney Kisling, NYSE, Nasdaq Vie for Facebook IPO, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 1, 2012, 6:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/facebook-
yet-to-friend-exchanges-as-nyse-nasdaq-vie-to-list-initial-offer.html (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2013) (describing the benefits securing the Facebook IPO would provide 
to NASDAQ) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. See Kayla Tausche, Nasdaq 100 Changes Listing Rules to Woo Facebook 
IPO, CNBC.COM (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47063617/ 
Nasdaq_100_Changes_Listing_Rules_to_Woo_Facebook_IPO (last visited Feb. 
22, 2013) (describing how the NASDAQ stock market changed its rules to allow 
a company to be listed on the Nasdaq-100 index in a quicker amount of time 
after its IPO, which “w[as] a key component in Facebook’s choosing to go public 
on Nasdaq instead of the New York Stock Exchange”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Kisling, supra note 246 (noting that the 
NYSE and NASDAQ were competing to have Facebook IPO on their respective 
exchanges). 
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reputation as the go-to exchange for technology companies, a 
$35,000 to $99,500 listing fee for the IPO itself, as well as the 
infinitely more valuable “trading and brand value” that comes 
from landing a big company like Facebook on one’s exchange.248 
Additionally, revenues from IPOs accounted for 22% of 
NASDAQ’s revenue in the third quarter of 2011.249 After news 
broke that the Facebook IPO would take place on the NASDAQ 
stock market, NASDAQ’s stock price rose and the NYSE’s fell—
evidence of the market’s position that securing the Facebook IPO 
made NASDAQ a more valuable business.250 
The Weissman court specifically provided that “efforts to 
increase trading volume and company profit” constituted “non-
governmental activities that serve [the SRO’s] private business 
interests.”251 The court also made it clear that activities 
undertaken “in the service of NASDAQ’s own business, not the 
government’s” do not warrant absolute immunity.252 
A federal district court has stated that the fact that the SEC 
approved the “pricing formula,” upon which NASDAQ’s “conduct 
will be judged[,] does not automatically convert Nasdaq’s conduct 
into an immunized ‘regulatory function.’”253 Thus, the SEC’s 
approval of NASDAQ’s authority to “operate and oversee the 
Nasdaq market” and the SEC’s approval of the NASDAQ Cross—
with knowledge that the Cross was to be used by NASDAQ to 
effectuate IPOs—does not mean that such actions constitute 
NASDAQ’s regulatory function.254 
                                                                                                     
 248. Kisling, supra note 246. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Evelyn Rusli, Facebook Is Said to Pick Nasdaq for I.P.O., N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/facebook-
picks-nasdaq-for-i-p-o/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (“For Nasdaq, Facebook is not 
just any listing.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 251. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 
2007) (en banc). 
 252. Id. at 1299. 
 253. Opulent Fund, L.P. v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. C-07-03683, 2007 
WL 3010573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007). 
 254. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167; see also NASDAQ Cross 
Approval, supra note 219 (approving the implementation of the NASDAQ 
Cross); supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text (describing the SEC’s 
approval of the NASDAQ Cross). 
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One could argue that NASDAQ, when effectuating IPOs, acts 
only for itself in the service of its own private, for-profit business 
and is therefore not entitled to absolute immunity. This makes 
some sense considering the overwhelming benefit that NASDAQ, 
as a private, for-profit corporation derives from IPOs generally, 
and the Facebook IPO specifically.255 The fact that the SEC 
approved the authority of NASDAQ to undertake IPOs, and even 
approved of the specific method used by NASDAQ to effectuate 
them, does not necessarily mean that such activities constitute a 
regulatory function.256 
3. Why a Court Should Find that NASDAQ Is Entitled to Absolute 
Immunity for Its Actions During the Facebook IPO 
A court will most likely find that IPOs fall within NASDAQ’s 
regulatory function.257 Additionally, no matter how NASDAQ’s 
actions during the Facebook IPO are reasonably characterized, 
the absolute immunity shield should cover NASDAQ’s conduct 
during the IPO.258 The cases brought against NASDAQ for its 
conduct during the Facebook IPO have been consolidated in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.259  
a. IPOs Will Be Considered a Regulatory Function 
A court in the Second Circuit will most likely find that IPOs 
constitute a regulatory function performed by NASDAQ for four 
                                                                                                     
 255. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text (detailing the benefits 
afforded to NASDAQ from the performance of IPOs). 
 256. Supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 257. See infra Part III.B.3.a (determining that IPOs should be considered a 
regulatory function). 
 258. See supra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of SROs afforded absolute 
immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims). 
 259. See SDNY Consolidation Order, supra note 7, at 43 (“[A]ll the NASDAQ 
Actions are henceforth consolidated.”). Extensive searches did not reveal a 
single instance of an SRO, in the financial sphere, being denied absolute 
immunity in either the Second Circuit or S.D.N.Y. While this in no way ends the 
determination, in a case such as this, with facts that weigh in favor of NASDAQ 
being afforded absolute immunity, the S.D.N.Y. is unlikely to deny NASDAQ 
absolute immunity given the Second Circuit precedent. 
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reasons: (1) the broad delegation of authority provided to 
NASDAQ to “operate and oversee” the NASDAQ Stock Market, a 
delegation of authority approved of by the SEC;260 (2) the SEC’s 
approval of the very method used by NASDAQ to effectuate IPOs, 
a function explicitly discussed in the proposal calling for the 
approval of the method by the SEC;261 (3) the fact that NASDAQ’s 
statutory responsibilities are broad enough to encompass the 
oversight of IPOs;262 and (4) the Second Circuit’s precedent 
regarding SRO immunity.263 
The NASD delegated authority to NASDAQ to “operate and 
oversee” the NASDAQ stock market.264 The SEC approved this 
delegation of authority.265 The Second Circuit, in DL Capital, 
explicitly detailed NASDAQ’s authority to “develop, operate, and 
maintain the Nasdaq Stock Market.”266 An SRO develops a stock 
market by adding to it, and an SRO maintains a stock market, in 
part, the same way, as companies delist over time forcing the 
SRO to add more companies to maintain the market’s present 
position. Therefore, the Second Circuit’s endorsement of 
NASDAQ’s regulatory authority to develop and maintain the 
NASDAQ stock market is an endorsement of the position that 
IPOs constitute a regulatory function of NASDAQ.267 There is no 
other way in which “develop” and “maintain” would make sense 
in this context.268  
NASDAQ effectuates IPOs via the NASDAQ Cross.269 
NASDAQ’s proposal to the SEC requesting SEC approval of the 
NASDAQ Cross contained numerous references to how NASDAQ 
                                                                                                     
 260. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167. 
 261. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim (referencing 
the various ways in which it would affect IPOs). 
 262. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012). 
 263. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 
2007) (stating that “action or inaction with respect to trading on the 
Exchange . . . is indisputably within the [SRO’s] regulatory powers”). 
 264. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167. 
 265. Id. 
 266. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See supra notes 184–92 and accompanying text (providing an 
explanation of the NASDAQ Cross). 
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would use the Cross to effectuate IPOs, among other functions.270 
The SEC approved NASDAQ’s proposal.271 
The statutory responsibilities by which NASDAQ, as a 
national securities exchange, must abide pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78f(b)(5)272 are broad enough to encompass the oversight of 
IPOs—particularly the provisions that require NASDAQ to 
“facilitat[e] transactions in securities,” “remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market,” and 
“protect investors and the public interest.”273 Arguably, IPOs 
accomplish all three objectives: IPOs facilitate transactions in 
securities and remove impediments to free and open markets by 
creating an opportunity for investors to own equity in companies 
previously unavailable for investment.274 IPOs also trigger 
mandatory disclosure obligations for companies listed on national 
securities exchanges, which “protect[s] investors and the public 
interest,” by making available a wide variety of information not 
previously accessible on a newly listed company.275 
Finally, the Second Circuit has stated that “action or inaction 
with respect to trading on the Exchange . . . is indisputably 
within the NYSE’s regulatory powers”—a position that, given the 
equivalent position that NASDAQ holds to the NYSE, affords 
NASDAQ regulatory power over IPOs.276 This is because IPOs 
unequivocally relate to “action or inaction with respect to trading” 
on the NASDAQ stock market.277 
A court, particularly one in the Second Circuit, would most 
likely determine that NASDAQ, in the performance of an IPO, is 
acting pursuant to its quasi-governmental regulatory function 
                                                                                                     
 270. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim (referencing 
the various ways in which it would affect IPOs). 
 271. See NASDAQ Cross Approval, supra note 219 (approving the NASDAQ 
Cross). 
 272. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012). 
 273. Id. 
 274. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 392 (noting how IPOs have 
“downside[s] for the company’s pre-existing owners[:] bringing in more equity 
owners dilutes the potential upside return”).  
 275. See id. at 169 (noting that “Congress adopted mandatory disclosure for 
companies with securities listed on a national securities exchange as part of the 
Exchange Act of 1934”). 
 276. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 277. Id. 
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and is therefore entitled to absolute immunity.278 A court would 
also most likely find that NASDAQ’s conduct during the 
Facebook IPO, however feasibly characterized, would be 
protected by its absolute immunity.279 
IV. Regulatory Functions and Absolute Immunity: A New 
Approach 
Courts have trouble determining whether actions undertaken 
by quasi-private SROs, such as NASDAQ, were undertaken 
pursuant to their regulatory function or their “non-governmental” 
“private business interests.”280 Occasionally, as may be the case 
with IPOs, actions undertaken by quasi-private SROs such as 
NASDAQ appear to constitute both regulatory action and private, 
for-profit business activity, rendering such a distinction 
impossible.281 Courts have devised a number of vague tests to 
determine whether challenged actions were undertaken pursuant 
to an SRO’s regulatory function or its nongovernmental private 
business interest.282 Rather than detail a new test which, given 
the complexity of the problem could be equally vague and 
problematic, a legislative solution is required.283 The SEC should 
                                                                                                     
 278. See supra Part III.B.3.a (determining that IPOs are within NASDAQ’s 
regulatory function). 
 279. See Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 
263 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[A]bsolute immunity must be absolute.”), aff’d, 219 F. 
App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007); supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute 
immunity cannot be successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized 
as wrongful, improper, incorrect, badly motivated, inept, abusive, undertaken in 
bad faith, undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful). 
 280. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs afforded and 
denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims). 
 281. See supra Part III.B.1–2 (detailing arguments that effectuating IPOs 
constitutes a regulatory function and a private, for-profit business activity). 
 282. See supra Part II.B.3 (providing examples of the vague tests employed 
by the courts). 
 283. Earlier drafts of this Note provided the following new test: First, courts 
should presume that actions undertaken by SROs warrant absolute immunity. 
Second, should questions arise as to whether an SRO’s actions were undertaken 
pursuant to its regulatory function or pursuant to its private, for-profit business 
interests, this presumption may be rebutted after consideration of the following 
factors: (1) the extent to which the SRO’s actions are analogous—substantively 
and in all material respects—to actions taken by other nongovernmental private 
corporations and (2) the substantial likelihood that the SRO would undertake 
1562 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1519 (2014) 
apply a version of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 
(FDIC) living will approach to NASDAQ and equivalent SROs, 
and it should remove the SRO’s absolute immunity for actions 
taken pursuant to its regulatory function.284 Part IV, in subpart 
A, introduces the new approach. Subpart B applies the new 
approach to NASDAQ’s conduct during the Facebook IPO. 
Subpart C provides counterarguments to the new approach.  
A. The New Approach 
The SEC should require SROs, like NASDAQ and the NYSE, 
that both perform a regulatory function and possess 
nongovernmental private business interests to detail a living will 
providing their “contingency plans for resolution [of the SRO’s 
activities] in the event of the [SRO’s] failure.”285 In cases like the 
Facebook IPO, the living will could be activated in the event of 
substantial, SRO-threatening, litigation. The SEC should require 
that every year, NASDAQ and the NYSE detail the approximate 
cost of running their national securities exchange for the next 
year—the national securities exchange operating cost. The SEC 
should further require that in the event of litigation against the 
SRO, the SRO’s national securities exchange operating cost is 
absolutely immune from liability under all circumstances. This 
would ensure that, irrespective of the outcome of any litigation, 
no matter how big, the national securities exchange would 
continue operating uninterrupted for at least a year.286 This 
would reduce the likelihood that a national securities exchange’s 
                                                                                                     
the same action with prior knowledge that, in so doing, the SRO would not be 
covered by absolute immunity. 
 284. FDIC Board Approves Final Rule Requiring Resolution Plans for 
Insured Depository Institutions Over $50 Billion, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Jan. 
17, 2012), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2012/pr12003.html (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2014) (announcing the FDIC’s approval of “a final rule requiring an 
insured depository institution with $50 billion or more in total assets to submit 
to the FDIC periodic contingency plans for resolution in the event of the 
institution’s failure”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 285. Id. 
 286. See id. (noting that “resolution plans for large and complex [SROs] are 
essential for their orderly and least-costly resolution” and will permit the SRO 
and SEC, in this case, to “resolve the institutions in a manner that limits any 
disruption from their insolvency” or litigation). 
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operations would be impacted by litigation, which could have a 
“catastrophic . . . [effect on] investor confidence and 
macroeconomic stability,” especially if such an exchange went 
bankrupt.287 This would also serve to remove the damage that the 
threat of large litigation could impose upon an SRO or national 
securities exchange. 
The SEC should also eliminate the SRO’s absolute immunity 
for actions taken pursuant to its regulatory function. While 
regulatory function immunity would no longer exist, SROs would 
still be afforded absolute immunity for actions undertaken 
pursuant to their adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions.288 
This makes sense given that such a determination hinges upon 
whether the conduct in question “share[d] . . . characteristics 
[with] the judicial process,” a fairly straightforward analysis.289 
B. The New Approach as Applied to the Facebook IPO 
The new approach would permit parties damaged in the 
Facebook IPO to bring suit directly against NASDAQ without 
having to first demonstrate that NASDAQ’s actions were 
undertaken pursuant to its nongovernmental private business 
interests. While not an issue in this case, under the new 
approach, the parties would first have to demonstrate that 
NASDAQ’s actions were not undertaken pursuant to its 
prosecutorial or adjudicatory function, an easy bar to clear in 
most instances.290 
This does not mean that NASDAQ is automatically liable for 
the $500 million in damages alleged to have been lost as a result 
of the “system difficulties” experienced by NASDAQ during the 
                                                                                                     
 287. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,714. 
 288. See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
SROs afforded absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions). 
 289. Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 
1985) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510–13 (1978))). 
 290. See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
SROs afforded absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions). 
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IPO.291 The parties must first prevail on their federal securities 
claims that NASDAQ “made material misrepresentations and 
omissions concerning the capability of its technology and trading 
platform” and their state law negligence claims that NASDAQ, 
“in breach of duties owed to investors, negligently failed to 
promptly and accurately process investors’ trades.”292 
While NASDAQ would not be protected by absolute 
immunity under the new approach, the plaintiffs’ claims must be 
litigated in full, and NASDAQ would be afforded all of the 
advantages of a defendant in the legal process.293 This would, 
arguably, permit a much more efficient resolution of the claims 
given that the substance of the claims could be litigated 
immediately, rather than only after the question of whether 
NASDAQ’s actions were undertaken pursuant to its regulatory 
function is litigated and resolved: a murky undertaking at best.294 
C. Counterarguments to the New Approach 
The new approach attempts to address the conflict inherent 
to SROs such as NASDAQ and the NYSE that balance their 
private, for-profit interests with their quasi-governmental, 
regulatory functions.295 The new approach is not without its own 
problems, however. Primarily, the new approach is vulnerable to 
the claim that removing an SRO’s absolute immunity for actions 
                                                                                                     
 291. McCrank, supra note 8. UBS alone lost over $350 million while Knight 
Capital Group, Inc. (Knight) lost roughly $35.4 million. UBS Comment Letter, 
supra note 206, at 2; Press Release, Knight Capital Grp., Inc., Knight Capital 
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taken pursuant to its regulatory function will unleash a torrent of 
legal claims against the SRO. The result of such a move could be 
threefold: the cost of operating an exchange and participating in 
one could rise; the incentive to own and operate a national 
securities exchange could fall; and national securities exchanges 
could, under extreme circumstances, go bankrupt.  
NASDAQ has stated that should it be forced to “bear all costs 
associated with system malfunctions and the varying reactions of 
market participants in their wake[,] . . . the cost of providing 
exchange services would have to rise dramatically for all 
investors to cover this material and new risk.”296 Such a result 
would be unfortunate, but market forces—particularly 
competition between the various national securities exchanges—
could function to minimize this risk.297 It is even possible that 
members would be inclined to pay larger costs knowing that 
should issues arise in the future, they would have an opportunity 
to bring suit and receive compensation for any losses they 
sustain.  
A reduction in the incentive to own and operate a national 
securities exchange poses a much larger problem. As NASDAQ 
has stated “[h]undreds of billions of dollars of securities 
transactions are matched through the systems of Nasdaq and 
other exchanges every day.”298 Given the incredibly large volume 
of transactions that SROs such as NASDAQ handle on a daily 
basis, the potential for liability is incredibly large and likely. 
Electronic trading today is so fast that massive liability can be 
generated in a matter of hours or even seconds, as Knight Capital 
Group’s $461 million in losses and near bankruptcy for the 
improper installation of new software suggests.299 Even if the 
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majority of the claims brought after the implementation of this 
Note’s new approach were ultimately found to be meritless, 
NASDAQ would expend a vast amount of its resources proving 
that that is the case. This complaint is valid and potentially 
lethal to the approach proposed here.  
While no perfect solution could be devised initially, the SEC 
and the SRO could monitor the claims as they come in and devise 
additional rules tailored to blocking the promulgation of meritless 
claims. In effect, this approach would statutorily provide for 
absolute immunity in specific instances or scenarios. This could 
be done in a fashion similar to NASDAQ’s existing Stock Market 
Rules300 (the Rules), perhaps with detailed comments and 
examples to illustrate the Rules’ application. NASDAQ’s Stock 
Market Rules provide that, except as stated in Rule 4626(b), 
“Nasdaq and its affiliates shall not be liable for any losses, 
damages, or other claims arising out of the Nasdaq Market 
Center or its use.”301 Rule 4626(b) provides, in part, “Nasdaq . . . 
may compensate users of the Nasdaq Market Center for losses 
directly resulting from the systems’ actual failure to correctly 
process an order, Quote/Order, message, or other data, provided 
the Nasdaq Market Center has acknowledged receipt of the order, 
Quote/Order, message, or data.”302  
Finally, while the national securities exchange would 
continue to function if the SRO that “operates and oversees” the 
exchange was bankrupted by the imposition of liability, given the 
explicit protection afforded to the national securities exchange’s 
operating cost, the event could still result in severe damage to 
investor confidence and could undermine “macroeconomic 
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stability.”303 It is even possible that a year might not be enough 
time to figure out what action to take with respect to the national 
securities exchange. This is also a valid concern. The continued 
operation of the national securities exchange for at least a year, 
however, would most likely provide the required buffer to devise 
a workable solution for the future.  
The new approach is not without fault. It can be fairly 
criticized as potentially rendering SROs such as NASDAQ 
vulnerable to a torrent of legal claims, many without merit. 
Removing the initial regulatory function hurdle should allow 
NASDAQ to more efficiently address such claims, however, 
enabling it to focus on the underlying claim or claims at issue. 
This approach also aligns the incentives of NASDAQ and its 
members appropriately: NASDAQ has a vested interest in acting 
as diligently as it can to avoid liability to its members in the 
future, an interest that correspondingly benefits NASDAQ’s 
members. 
V. Conclusion 
NASDAQ has two hats. Wearing its regulator hat, NASDAQ, 
acting pursuant to its quasi-governmental prosecutorial, 
adjudicatory, and regulatory functions, provides vital day-to-day 
regulation and administration of a national securities exchange. 
When wearing this hat, NASDAQ is absolutely immune from 
common law liability.304 NASDAQ may be liable for limited 
damages pursuant to its own Stock Market Rules, however.305 
Wearing its corporate hat, NASDAQ, acting pursuant to its 
nongovernmental private business interests, is beholden to its 
173 million shareholders.306 When wearing this hat, NASDAQ is 
fully liable for its actions.307  
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The crux of NASDAQ’s liability, therefore, depends upon 
which hat NASDAQ is wearing for a given action. This 
determination is relatively straightforward when NASDAQ is 
performing either its prosecutorial or adjudicatory function.308 
Distinguishing between NASDAQ’s nongovernmental private 
business interests and its regulatory function is incredibly 
problematic. Although a variety of vague tests exist to 
differentiate between the two functions, none are convincing in 
application, predictable for the parties involved, or an efficient 
use of scarce judicial resources.309 This problem is especially 
acute given the rapid pace of electronic trading, and the 
increasingly global and the increasingly significant position 
national securities exchanges, such as NASDAQ’s, occupy.310  
The Facebook IPO is illustrative of this problem: due to 
NASDAQ’s “system difficulties,” roughly $500 million in damages 
was incurred by major market makers and broker dealers in a 
matter of hours.311 Should NASDAQ face any liability for these 
“system difficulties”? 
Given the vital role that SROs such as NASDAQ play in both 
the United States and global economy, the law cannot afford to be 
vague about whether NASDAQ’s actions constitute a regulatory 
function and thus warrant absolute immunity, or constitute a 
private, for-profit business activity and are therefore exposed to 
liability. Which hat NASDAQ is wearing matters, and it matters 
a lot. Therefore, the SEC should not settle for the currently 
ambiguous state of the law with respect to determining when an 
SRO, such as NASDAQ, is acting pursuant to its regulatory 
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function or its nongovernmental private business interests. The 
SEC should adopt the new approach presented here and remove 
the SRO’s absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to its 
regulatory function. The SEC should also require SROs such as 
NASDAQ and the NYSE to adopt a living will specifying the 
national securities exchange operating costs for the following 
year. That pool of money should be, unconditionally, entitled to 
absolute immunity. This method ensures the continuity of the 
national securities exchanges despite any liability imposed; 
preserves judicial resources by allowing the parties to litigate the 
heart of their claims against SROs initially; and aligns the SRO’s 
incentives with their members—both of whom benefit from a 
diligent and risk-averse national securities exchange. 
  
